KEGAGALAN INTELIJEN AS DALAM KASUS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IRAK 2003
Keywords:
Kegagalan Intelijen, Senjata Pemusnah Massal (WMD), Irak, Amerika Serikat, Penilaian AncamanAbstract
Abstract: Invasi Amerika Serikat ke Irak pada tahun 2003 didasarkan pada keyakinan bahwa rezim Saddam Hussein memiliki program Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan kegagalan intelijen AS dalam menilai keberadaan WMD serta pengaruhnya terhadap legitimasi invasi Irak. Metode yang digunakan adalah penelitian kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus melalui analisis literatur, laporan investigasi, dan dokumen resmi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kegagalan intelijen dipengaruhi oleh keterbatasan sumber informasi, bias kognitif analis, asumsi yang keliru, serta politisasi intelijen dalam proses pengambilan keputusan. Pembahasan mengungkap bahwa informasi yang lemah dan ambigu ditafsirkan sebagai bukti keberadaan WMD sehingga memperkuat narasi ancaman Irak. Simpulan penelitian ini adalah bahwa kegagalan intelijen AS merupakan hasil interaksi antara kesalahan analitis dan tekanan politik yang menghasilkan penilaian ancaman yang tidak akurat serta menjadi dasar justifikasi invasi Irak tahun 2003.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Aliya Shabira Arifin, Anindya Narda Yasmina, Anisa Sekarayu Yuwana, Cindy Rizky Az Zahra, Agnes Sihombing, Abigail Febrianti, Ivandra Solihin (Author)
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